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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Strictly Scrutinizing Fullilove v. Klutznick:
A Proposed Analytical Model for Supreme Court Review
of Congressional Legislation
The Supreme Court traditionally has evaluated equal protection chal-
lenges to the validity of legislation using racial classifications by applying an
ends-means analysis that incorporates a judicially fashioned standard of re-
view called "strict scrutiny."' In keeping with this tradition, Justice Powell
alone explicitly adopted a strict scrutiny approach with a few modifications to
join five other Justices in upholding a statutory preference for minority-owned
businesses. The six-to-three decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick 2 yielded no ma-
jority opinion, but it did hold that the congressional use of a racial quota in
affirmative action legislation did not violate the equal protection component of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Justice Marshall, in an opinion
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, determined that an ends-means
analysis with an intermediate standard was more appropriate for review of
affirmative action legislation. 3 Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion in which
Justices White and Powell4 joined, explicitly rejected the analytical formulas
applied in the other two concurring opinions.5 The analytical model the Chief
Justice devised, however, bore a striking resemblance to the strict scrutiny ap-
proach articulated in Justice Powell's separate opinion.6
It is the contention of this Note that contrary to Justice Powell's reason-
ing, the Court's standard of review in Fullilove should not have been triggered
by the racial classification itself, which customarily has dictated a strict scru-
tiny standard. Likewise, the standard should not have been triggered by the
benign purpose for which the racial quota was to be used, which, according to
Justice Marshall, would have dictated an intermediate standard. The standard
in Fullilove should have been determined, instead, by the fact that the Court
was reviewing an exercise of congressional power, a circumstance that consist- -
ently has demanded the most deferential standard, the rational basis standard
of review.7 This approach has its origins in the seminal decision of American
1. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
2. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
3. Id. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
4. Justice Powell, although concurring in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, wrote separately to
apply explicitly the strict scrutiny analysis he developed. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 492 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). The Justices who wrote the other two concurring
opinions each stated that the analytical formulas they were applying in Fulllove had been articu-
lated in their opinions in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 448 U.S. at
496 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. See text accompanying notes 15-24 infra.
7. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325-26 (1980) (The Hyde Amendment, a congres-
sional amendment that did not permit federal reimbursement of all medically necessary abortions,
was considered to bear a "rational relationship" to the federal government's interest in protecting
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constitutional law, McCulloch v. Maryland.8 In 1819, while reviewing the con-
stitutionality of another act of Congress, Chief Justice John Marshall outlined
in McCulloch an ends-means analytical model containing a standard of review
consistent with this deferential attitude.9 The Fullilove opinions indicate, how-
ever, that the Court has forgotten this analytical approach and in so doing has
found itself unable to formulate a consistent and definitive equal protection
analysis for review of congressional legislation.
In focusing on the opinions written by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell, this Note will argue that the strict scrutiny approaches used in each
opinion are inappropriate for review of congressional legislation claimed to
violate the equal protection guarantee. Inconsistencies created by such an ap-
plication will be examined. In applying a more appropriate analytical
model-the McCulloch analysis-this Note will suggest how these inconsisten-
cies can be corrected. Finally, several reasons rooted in the political process
and confirmed by congressional history will be offered to support the applica-
tion of the McCulloch analysis to suits challenging the validity of congres-
sional legislation.
The Court in Fullilove examined the congressional enactment of the "mi-
nority business enterprise" (MBE) provision in the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977.10 This provision requires that, absent an administrative waiver,
at least ten percent of the federal funds granted to state and local governments
for public works projects must be set aside for minority businesses.11 Plaintiffs
in Fullilove alleged that the MBE provision violated the equal protection com-
ponent of the fifth amendment's due process clause, the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and several antidiscrimination statutes. 12
The federal district court upheld the validity of the MBE provision, 13 and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 14 A divided Supreme Court af-
the potential life of the fetus.); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 577-78 (1975) (The Court
upheld a congressional statute that accorded female naval officers a thirteen-year tenure of com-
missioned service before mandatory discharge for want of promotion, while requiring mandatory
discharge of male officers who were twice passed over for promotion but might have fewer than
thirteen years of service. "Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that women line
officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male counterparts, and that a longer
period of tenure for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide wo-
men officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement programs.' "). See Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (Civil Service Commission regulation that excluded aliens
from employment in most federal service positions was held to vio ate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. The Court stated in the course of its holding, however, that "if the rule were
expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which
might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption.").
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9. For a description of this analytical model, see text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-28, §§ 101-111, 91 Stat. 116 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (Supp. III
1979)).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979) (The included minorities are "Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."). The requirement may be waived when a
grantee demonstrates the infeasibility of achieving the ten percent requirement. Id.; see 123 Cong.
Rec. 5328-29 (1977) (remarks of Reps. Mitchell & Roe).
12. 448 U.S. at 455 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
13. Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
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firmed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the MBE provision did
not violate the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.
As mentioned previously, Chief Justice Burger's opinion and Justice Pow-
ell's separate concurrence both could be characterized as traditional strict scru-
tiny approaches with a few modifications. The traditional strict scrutiny
analysis considers three factors: (1) whether there is a compelling state inter-
est furthered by the legislation; (2) whether the means chosen are necessary to
effectuate that interest; and (3) whether less intrusive means are available to
effectuate that interest.15 In determining whether there was a "compelling
state interest" furthered by the legislation, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell asked whether Congress had the constitutional power to remedy past
discrimination and if Congress had sufficient findings which demonstrated
that this discrimination had adversely affected minority businesses. 16 Both
Justices concluded that the commerce and spending powers and the enforce-
ment clause of the fourteenth amendment 17 endowed Congress with the power
to remedy the effects of past discrimination.' 8 After an exhaustive review not
only of the administrative and legislative history of the bill, but also of the
"total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with the problems
of racial discrimination against minority business enterprises,"' 19 both Justices
determined that Congress had sufficient findings to establish that "purposeful
discrimination contributed significantly to the small percentage of federal con-
tracting funds that minority business enterprises [had] received."'20
In addressing the second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, the Justices
sought to determine whether the means chosen were "reasonably necessary" 21
or "narrowly tailored."22 In answering this question, both Justices conducted
a "searching examination" 3 of the quota by analyzing many factors, an exam-
ination akin to the "less intrusive means" test--the third prong of the tradi-
tional strict scrutiny analysis. Between them, the two Justices surveyed
(i) the efficacy of alternatives; (ii) the planned duration of the set-aside;
(iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be em-
ployed and the percentage of minority workers in the relevant work force or
population; (iv) the availability of quota waivers; (v) the effect of the set-aside
upon innocent third parties; and (vi) the under/over-inclusiveness of the
15. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 635, 637 (1969). See also Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1101-04 (1969). See generally G. Gunther,
Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 670-971 (10th ed. 1980); L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 991-1136 (1978).
16. See 448 U.S. at 472-73 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."). Justice Powell concluded that the enforcement clause
of the thirteenth amendment was also a source of power. 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. See 448 U.S. at 472-76 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 499-500 (Powell, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 503 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 506 (Powell, J., concurring). See id. at 486 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
21. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 480 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
23. Id. at 491 (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
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quota.24 Both Justices concluded the quota was permissible.
Although he used an ends-means analysis in his opinion, Justice Marshall
applied an intermediate standard that considered: (1) whether the racial clas-
sifications, designed to remedy the effects of past discrimination, served impor-
tant governmental objectives; and (2) whether the ten percent set-aside was
substantially related to achievement of these objectives. 25 He concluded that
the legislation met both tests.
The Court has addressed the claim of "reverse discrimination" as a viola-
tion of equal protection only once before-in Regents of the Universiy of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke.26 Bakke, a white male whose application to the state medical
school was rejected, challenged the legality of the school's admissions program
in which sixteen of the one hundred positions in the class were reserved for
"disadvantaged" minority students. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens,
Stewart and Rehnquist rejected the Regents' minority admissions quota on
statutory grounds.27 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun
reached the equal protection issue and found the quota unobjectionable. 28
Justice Powell broke the deadlock by rejecting the quota because it violated
the equal protection guarantee but indicated that some race-conscious action
may be acceptable. 29 Justice Powell set forth in Bakke the modified strict
scrutiny analysis he applied two years later in Fullilove. He held that the spe-
cial admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment because the ad-
missions committee did not have the authority to establish that it had
discriminated against minorities in the past. 30 In other words, the program
was illegal because it failed to satisfy the "compelling state interest" prong of
his modified strict scrutiny analysis.
In developing an equal protection analysis for suits challenging racial
classifications, the Court has held that racial classifications trigger the most
stringent level of judicial review and concomitant opportunity for judicial in-
tervention. 3 ' On the other hand, the Court has also held that review of an act
of Congress triggers the most deferential attitude or level ofjudicial scrutiny in
its equal protection analysis.32 These two judicial postures square off against
each other in a case such as Fullilove, in which a congressional statute is chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds because it uses a racial classification.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell attempted to resolve this conflict in
Fullilove by applying a modified strict scrutiny approach, creating several in-
consistencies in the course of their analyses. It is the contention of this Note,
24. Id. at 484-89 (opinion of Burger, CJ.); id. at 510-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Stewart & Rehnquist, J.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
29. Id. at 269-324 (opinion of Powell, J.).
30. Id. at 309 (opinion of Powell, J.).
31. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
32. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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however, that if the Justices had selected, instead, the most deferential analyti-
cal model-the McCulloch analysis--their constitutional analyses of the con-
gressional legislation would have avoided these inconsistencies. Furthermore,
they would have fulfilled their judicial duty of review without treading on
legislative ground.
In McCulloch Chief Justice Marshall had to determine whether Congress
had the power to incorporate a bank33 or whether such an exercise of power
violated the tenth amendment mandate that the powers "not delegated to the
United States. . . are reserved to the states. . .. -"34 Marshall first noted that
although the power to incorporate a bank was not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, it could be considered an implied or incidental power-a
means by which to carry out other enumerated powers.35 More importantly,
the power to exercise these implied or incidental powers was specifically
granted to Congress in article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution.36
That section states that Congress has the power "[tlo make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers. . . ,,37 In McCulloch, therefore, the power to in-
corporate a bank was an incidental or implied power-a "necessary and
proper" means-of executing five specifically enumerated powers: the power
"to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare
and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies."38
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the constitutionality of any exercise
of congressional power should be measured with reference to the following
rule:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 39
The Chief Justice's statement, which is the essence of the McCulloch analysis,
can be divided into a three-prong test which inquires: (1) whether there is an
enumerated power upon which the means (the incidental or implied power)
rests;40 (2) whether the means are "plainly adapted" to the ends;41 and
(3) whether the means are expressly prohibited by the Constitution or violate
a substantive constitutional right. 42
33. The first Congress had created and incorporated the first national bank in 1791, but its
charter was not renewed in 1811. In 1816 the Congress established the Second Bank of the United
States. G. Gunther, John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 4 (1969).
34. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406 (quoting U.S. Const. amend: X).
35. Id. at 411.
36. Id. at 411-12.
37. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cL. 18.
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
39. Id. at 421.
40. This prong is analogous to the phrase "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution."
41. This prong is the same as the phrase "[means] which are plainly adapted to that end." If
this prong and the third prong are satisfied, the means are "appropriate."
42. This prong is analogous to the phrase "[means] which are not prohibited, but consist with
1982]
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The Court held that the congressional decision to incorporate a bank was
a valid exercise of an enumerated power and, therefore, did not violate the
broad constitutional mandate of the tenth amendment. In so doing the Court
did not need to deal with the third prong of its analytical model which asks
whether the means selected violate any express prohibitions or substantive
rights in the Constitution. Instead, the Court merely implied that the tenth
amendment-a broad statement that is neither an express prohibition nor a
substantive right-was not violated if the first two prongs of the analysis were
satisfied. That is, the tenth amendment was not violated if (1) there was an
enumerated power upon which the means rested, and (2) the Congress was
validly exercising that enumerated power. The Court determined that the ex-
ercise of power was valid simply by examining the relationshp between the
enumerated power (the ends) and the implied or incidental power (the means).
That is, if the means were "plainly adapted" (or had a rational relationship) 43
to the ends, they were considered a valid exercise of the enumerated power. In
determining whether the means were "plainly adapted" to the ends, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall examined the contemporary record upon which Congress
grounded its decision to incorporate the bank; he did not merely imagine any
conceivable basis for the exercise of congressional power.44 The resulting
analysis, therefore, could be described as a classic ends-means analysis com-
bined with a standard of review that one commentator has called "rational
basis with bite."45
It is the contention of this Note that Fullilove and cases like it should be
analyzed under the first two prongs of the McCulloch analysis. That is, cases
should be treated under the McCulloch analysis if (1) they involve a congres-
the letter and spirit of the constitution." (The phrase "[means that] consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution" is the inverse of the phrase "[means] which are not prohibited.") If this
prong and the second prong are satisfied, the means are "appropriate."
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409-10. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 15, § 5-3, at 230.
44. The court observed:
The bill for incorporating the bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspect-
ing legislature, id pass unobserved .... The original act was permitted to expire; but
a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the
government, convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its neces-
sity, and induced the passage of the present law.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
That [a bank] is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its
fiscal operations, is not now a subject of controversy. All those who have been con-
cerned in the administration of our finances, have concurred in representing its impor-
tance and necessity; and so strongly have they been felt, that statesmen of the first class,
whose previous opinions against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can
fix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies of the nation.
Id. at 422-23.
In applying the rational basis standard of review the Court historically has allowed any con-
ceivable basis to support the congressional selection of means. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
45. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
"Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the Court would be
less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would have the Court
assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not
merely conjecture." Id.
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sional exercise of an enumerated power, (2) the means selected are claimed to
violate a broad constitutional mandate (such as the tenth amendment 46 or the
implied equal protection component of the fifth amendment) and (3) no sub-
stantive rights or express prohibitions are claimed to be violated. A compari-
son of the traditional strict scrutiny test and the McCulloch analysis will
illustrate the appropriateness of each analytical model when applied to cases
like Fullilove, which review the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
The first prong of the McCulloch analysis-that the means selected rest
upon an "enumerated power"-serves the same analytical purpose as the first
prong of the strict scrutiny analysis-that the means further a "compelling
state interest." The terms used in each, however, implicitly recognize the dif-
ference in sources of power upon which each analytical model rests. The term
"enumerated power" refers to those powers delegated to Congress in the Con-
stitution and directs the Court to that document when determining whether
the means selected rest upon a congressional power.47 "Enumerated power" is
a more accurate term for an analysis of the constitutionality of congressional
acts than the broader concept of "compelling state interest" because Congress
technically does not have any "interests" other than the powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. Use of the general term "interests" is more
appropriate when analyzing the validity of an exercise of state power since
state legislatures may exercise all power not reserved to the federal govern-
ment by the Constitution. In other words, Congress has only constitutionally
enumerated powers,48 while the states have no constitutionally enumerated
powers.49 From this distinction flows the major difference between strict scru-
tiny analysis and the McCulloch analysis-they rest on opposite underlying
presumptions.
The strict scrutiny analysis50 rests on the presumption that the enactment
of legislation containing racial classifications violates the equal protection pro-
vision of the fourteenth amendment51 because the state has no constitutionally
enumerated power with which to support its use of the classification. To be-
gin to overcome this presumption, the state first must demonstrate an over-
whelming or "compelling state interest," an interest which rises to the level of
a constitutional power. The presumption of invalidity is not rebutted, how-
ever, unless the racial classification (the means) is "necessary" to effectuate the
interest (the ends). To ensure that this second prong, the "necessary" stan-
dard, is met, the means are measured under the third prong of the strict scru-
tiny analysis: the Court determines if there are any "less intrusive means"
available to carry out the state goal. Under this most rigorous judicial stan-
46. U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
48. Id.
49. See U.S. Const. amend. X
50. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
51. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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dard the Court inquires extensively into the legislature's choice of means.5 2
The presumption is shifted, however, in the McCu/och analysis. That
analytical model rests on the presumption that the means selected do not vio-
late the Constitution if, under the first prong, Congress can support its selec-
tion of means with at least one enumerated power. Chief Justice Marshall
explained the presumption in these words:
The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed
on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates
of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that
it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of
effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of
establishing that exception.5 3
This presumption of validity ultimately rests on the notion that the provisions
in the Constitution are consistent with one another5 4 so that the mere exercise
of congressional constitutional power will not automatically violate another
constitutional provision.
This presumption of validity is tested under the second prong of the Mc-
Culloch analysis. The Court determines whether the exercise of power is valid
by examining the relationship between the enumerated power (the ends) and
the incidental or implied power (the means). In Fullilove, for example, the
contemporary record indicated that the racial classifications chosen were
"plainly adapted" or rationally related to the congressional goal in remedying
the effects of past discrimination pursuant to the enforcement clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the spending and commerce powers.55 The exer-
cise of power would almost certainly have been considered "appropriate"
under the MeCulioch analysis. The third prong of the analysis would not be
triggered in a case like Fullilove because the quota was not claimed to violate
any express prohibitions or substantive constitutional rights. Satisfaction of
52. Applying a strict scrutiny standard to review a state legislature's choice of means, while
using a more deferential standard to review an act of Congress, may produce seemingly inconsis-
tent results. That is, identical legislation may be deemed unconstitutional if enacted by a state
government but constitutional if passed by the Congress. These inconsistent results can be recon-
ciled-the Constitution grants Congress, and not the states, specific power to legislate in certain
areas. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). There the Court held that a New
York civil service law that provided that only United States citizens could hold permanent posi-
tions in the competitive class of the state's civil service violated the equal protection guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment. In contrast, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 95 (1976),
the Court stated that Sugarman was not controlling if the Congress passed a similar statute be-
cause "Congress and the President have broad power over immigration and naturalization which
the States do not possess."
53. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409-10.
54. Chief Justice Marshall implicitly recognized this principle in McCulloch:
Even the 10th amendment ... omits the word "expressly," and declares only that the
powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to
the States or to the people;" thus leaving the question, whether the particular power
which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government, or
prohibited to the other, to depend on afair construction of the whole instrument.
Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
55. See 448 U.S. at 480-81 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 502-06 (Powell, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger conducted an extensive review of the contemporary record. Id. at 461-72
(opinion of Burger, CJ.).
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the first two prongs of the McCulloch analysis, which examine whether Con-
gress is validly exercising its powers, is sufficient to support the presumption
that the means do not violate the broad mandate of the equal protection
guarantee.
The McCulloch analysis ensures, therefore, that the congressional use of a
racial classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee, while al-
lowing Congress the freedom to exercise its broad legislative powers. This
analytical approach also corrects some inconsistencies created by the Court's
application of a modified strict scrutiny analysis in the congressional context.
One inconsistency arises when the Court applies a "necessary" standard to
review a congressionally authorized racial quota although the Court tradition-
ally has held that the Constitution permits Congress to exercise "any appropri-
ate means" in carrying out its enumerated powers.56 In McCulloch Chief
Justice Marshall interpreted the "necessary and proper" clause as demanding
only "appropriate" means, not "indispensibly necessary" ones.57 Subsequent
cases not only have reiterated this decision,58 but have applied this "appropri-
ate" standard when reviewing an exercise of congressional power under the
enforcement clauses of the thirteenth,59 fourteenth 60 and fifteenth 61 amend-
ments as well. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell aptly illustrate this
constitutional inconsistency in their opinions in Fullilove when they find them-
selves unable to reconcile their "necessary" means standards with the deferen-
tial, "appropriate" means standard they acknowledge has been traditionally
accorded congressional decisions. 62 In trying to resolve the conflict, the two
Justices watered down their "necessary" standards to a "reasonably neces-
sary" 63 and a "narrowly tailored" 4 standard. Yet, Justice Powell, at least, still
maintains he is applying a strict scrutiny standard of review.65
Furthermore, this application of strict scrutiny analysis means the Court
is adopting a judicial posture inconsistent with its strong tradition of according
deference to determinations made by a coequal branch of the federal govern-
ment.66 That is, in cases involving the congressional use of a racial classifica-
tion, the Court finds itself in a position where it can defeat a congressional
56. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 414-16.
58. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-62 (1964); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941).
59. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation."). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968).
60. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."). See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
61. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-28 (1966).
62. See 448 U.S. at 490-92 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 480 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
65. Id. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. E.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
19821
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choice of "appropriate" means if they do not meet the stringent "necessary"
standard. Chief Justice Marshall commented on the impropriety of this in-
terventionist stance in McCulloch: "But where the law is not prohibited, and
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to
inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circum-
scribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground."'67 In Full!-
love, for example, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell could have
invalidated the ten percent quota if it had failed any one of the numerous tests
they had erected to review it.68 If they had found, for example, that other
"less intrusive means" were available, that the planned duration of the set-
aside was too long, or that the quota was impermissibly under-inclusive or
over-inclusive, the quota could have been struck down as unconstitutional.
. The most compelling inconsistency arises when the strict scrutiny pre-
sumption of invalidity is applied to congressional exercises of constitutional
power. In a strict scrutiny analysis the Court presumes that a congressional
exercise of constitutional power violates the equal protection guarantee merely
because the legislation utilizes a racial quota. In failing to presume that these
constitutional provisions are more likely to be consistent than inconsistent
with one another, the Court could conceivably cancel out the legitimate exer-
cise of a constitutional power on the grounds that it violates another broad
constitutional provision, the parameters of which are amenable to a liberal
interpretation. 69 The results produced in such an analysis can be absurd in-
deed. In Fulllove, for example, the Court could have defeated the use of af-
firmative-action quotas on the grounds that such a practice violated the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment even though Congress passed
this legislation pursuant to several constitutional powers, including the en-
forcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, a provision that exhorts Con-
gress to carry out the equal protection guarantee. In other words, the
legitimate exercise of power to further a particular goal could have been struck
down as a violation of that same goal under a strict scrutiny analysis.
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)
(opinion of Holmes, J.).
In the McGrath opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated that the Court must have "due regard to
the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those
who also have taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for
carrying on government." 341 U.S. at 164.
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
68. These tests are presented at text accompanying note 24 supra.
69. In adopting a presumption of validity, the Court, in effect, is submitting to a congres-
sional determination of the meaning of a broad constitutional mandate. Such a stance is in keep-
ing with the settled constitutional rule "that as between two possible interpretations of a statute
. . . our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act." Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142,
148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.).
In addition, it has been stated by at least one commentator that the Congress can make a
stronger argument than the Court as the most appropriate final authority to resolve controversies
about the meaning of the Constitution, a document whose content evolves over time. That argu-
ment rests on two democratic premises: "first, that law should be responsive to the interests of the
citizenry; and second, that in the long run it will be so only if lawmakers are amenable to popular
control through ordinary political processes." Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1166 (1977).
[Vol. 60
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
It has been argued that judicial deference to congressional decisions is
unsuited to legislation that includes racial classifications. Strict scrutiny is a
more effective standard, proponents argue, because in a political process in
which the majority rules, a minority cannot adequately protects its interests.70
It is contended that the equal protection provisions of the Constitution de-
mand that the judiciary protect "discrete and insular minorities."' 7I One com-
mentator, however, has answered this argument by pointing out that the
political process leading to deliberate congressional decisions affecting minori-
ties contains internal safeguards for minority interests.72 Among these safe-
guards is the "effect upon the political process of an extraordinary variety of
interest groups" and their "crosscutting loyalties and identities. ' 73 The "inter-
est group" safeguard has been explained this way:
To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political
party must appeal to a variety of "interests" and a wide spectrum of
opinion. As a consequence of their catholicity, the major parties are
unthinkable as instruments of tyranny because "it is impossible for
the party in power to oppress any element of the opposition party
without oppressing a corresponding element within its own ranks."
In addition, the party in power knows that any effort to "tyrannize" a
particular minority may also antagonize other groups in the majority
coalition, as well as the "independents" pursued by both major par-
ties, and, therefore, may cost it the next election.
In short, the "monolithic" majority. . . does not exist; the ma-
jority is but a coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate,
broadly representative fashion to preserve itself.74
In addition, the organizational structure and procedures of Congress per-
mit minority groups to exercise power beyond their mere numbers to protect
their interests.75 They can prevent the enactment of unfavorable legislation by
using several devices, including the following examples:76 the committee sys-
tem;77 the filibuster in the Senate78 and the Rules Committee in the House.79
70. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
71. Id. at 152 n.4.
72. Sandalow, supra note 69, at 1190-91.
73. Id. at 1190.
74. Id. (quoting Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,
One Value, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 52) (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1192.
76. Id.
77. The committee system has been defined as follows:
A committee may approve, alter (even totally revamp), kill or ignore proposals re-
ferred to it. It is difficult-almost impossible--to circumvent a committee that is deter-
mined not to act; a bill that has been approved by a committee may be amended when it
reaches the House or Senate floor, but extensive changes are difficult and seldom occur.
The work of a committee essentially becomes the work of Congress.
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress 365 (2d ed. 1976).
78. The filibuster has been defined as follows:
A time delaying tactic used by a minority in an effort to prevent a vote on a bill
which probably would pass if brought to a vote. The most common method is to take
advantage of the Senate's rules permitting unlimited debate, but other forms of parlia-
mentary maneuvering may be used. The stricter rules in the House make filibusters
1982]
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Commentators conclude, therefore, that strict judicial review of deliberately
considered congressional legislation "merely permits courts to substitute their
decisions for those of Congress . ... 80 It can be argued in response that
only well-organized, powerful minority groups are protected in such a demo-'
cratic system, so that judicial intervention is required to protect impotent mi-
norities. However, if a minority is the target of invidious, or irrational,
discrimination, judicial review using the McCulloch analysis should detect it.81
Finally, the statistics reflecting Supreme Court decisions on the constitu-
tionality of state and federal statutes indicate that the political process leading
to deliberate congressional decisions does provide adequate protection for mi-
norities. While the Supreme Court repeatedly has struck down state laws that
use invidious racial classifications,82 it has never found the congressional use
more difficult, but they are attempted from time to time through various delaying tactics
arising from loopholes in House rules.
Id. at xxvi (glossary of congressional terms).
79. The House Rules Committee has been defined as follows:
The House Rules Committee has long stood as a strategic gateway between the
legislative committees and the floor of the House for a small but important part of the
chamber's legislative business. The power of the committee lies in its roles of setting the
agenda and allotting time for debate on those important and usually controversial bills
that are not disposed of by the more routine procedures of the House. Thus the commit-
tee often has been able to prevent or delay bills it opposes from reaching the House floor.
Id. at 385.
80. Sandalow, supra note 69, at 1192.
81. For example, assume that Congress were to pass a ten percent quota favoring white-
owned businesses. Such a set-aside should be declared unconstitutional because presumably there
would be no findings of discrimination against whites to support a rational relationship between
the use of the quota and the congressional power exercised, i.e., the enforcement clause of the
fourteenth amendment under which Congress has an interest in remedying the effects of
discrimination.
82. A cursory examination of the list of state laws which the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional reveals that well over fifteen cases involved statutes which on their face invidi-
ously discriminated against members of racial minorities. E.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (Alabama statutes requiring racial segregation in prisons and jails violate the equal protec-
tion clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Vir statute prohibiting interracial mar-
riage violates the equal protection clause); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Florida
criminal statute prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in and occupy-
ing the same room in the nighttime violates the equal protection clause); Lassiter v. United States,
371 U.S. 10 (per curiam) (Louisiana laws that segregated passengers in terminal facilities of com-
mon carriers violate the equal protection clause), afl'g 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La. 1962); Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (Tennessee statute and administrative regulation sanction-
ing racial segregation in a private restaurant operated on premises leased from a city violate the
equal protection clause); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (Mississippi statutes that required
racial segregation at interstate and intrastate transportation facilities violate the equal protection
clause); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (per curiam) (Louisiana statutes
violated the equal protection clause when they (1) provided for segregation of races in public
schools and the withholding of funds from integrated schools, (2) conferred on the Governor the
right to close all schools upon integration of any one of them, and (3) directed the Governor to
supersede a school board under a court order to desegregate and take over management of public
schools violate the equal protection clause), afl'g 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960); State Athletic
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam) (Louisiana statute prohibiting athletic con-
tests between Negroes and white persons violates the equal protection clause), atFg 168 F. Supp.
149 (E.D. La. 1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per cunam) (Alabama statutes that required
segregation of white and Negro races on motor buses in the City violate the equal protection
clause), atfg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(state constitutional and statutory provisions requiring segregation of white and Negro children in
public schools on the basis of race deny Negro children the equal protection of the laws); McLau-
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of a racial classification unconstitutional.8 3 It can be argued that resort to
these statistics merely begs the question as to the legitimacy of congressional
legislation; the Supreme Court simply does not dare undo congressional deter-
minations.84 However, an inference can be drawn from the statistics that it is
the states, which do not have the same political checks that Congress has, that
historically have enacted legislation containing invidious racial classifications,
not Congress. Indeed, in light of Congress' passage of civil rights legislation
since at least 1875,85 it is unlikely that it would begin suddenly to discriminate
invidiously now.
rin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Oklahoma law requiring segregation in edu-
cational facilities at institutions of higher learning violates the equal protection clause); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Texas constitutional and statutory provisions restricting admission to
the University of Texas Law School to white students violate the equal protection clause); Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam) (Oklahoma constitutional and statutory
provisions barring Negroes from the University of Oklahoma Law School violate the equal pro-
tection clause because the University Law School is the only institution for legal education main-
tained by the State); Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri statute that
accorded Negro residents financial aid to enable them to obtain instruction at out-of-state univer-
sities equivalent to that afforded exclusively to white students at the University of Missouri vio-
lates the equal protection clause because the obligation to give equal protection of the laws can be
performed only within a state's own jurisdiction); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas
White Primary Law that barred Negroes from participation in Democratic Party primary elections
violates the equal protection clause); and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (West
Virginia law barring Negroes from jury service violates the equal protection clause).
Moreover, this number does not take into account the cases that were facially neutral, but
whose effect, nonetheless, was to discriminate invidiously against a racial minority. E.g., United
States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (North Carolina statute that au-
thorized creation of a new school district in a city that was part of a larger county school system is
void inasmuch as its effect would be to impede the dismantling of the dual school system by
affording a refuge to white students fleeing desegregation); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (California constitutional provision adopted on referendum repealing "open housing" law
and prohibiting state abridgment of realty owner's right to sell and lease, or to refuse to sell and
lease as he pleases, violates the equal protection clause); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)
(Louisiana statute requiring that m all primary, general or speci4elections, the nomination pa-
pers and ballots shall designate the race of the candidates violates ae equal protection clause).
83. Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld the congressional use of a racial classification
three times in modem history. Besides Fullilove, the Court sanctioned the use of a suspect classifi-
cation in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). Those two decisions, which upheld the placing of citizens of Japanese ancestry
under curfew and in camps during World War II, have been severely criticized. However, those
two cases should not be used as evidence in maintaining that strict scrutiny analysis and its con-
comitant presumption of validity are needed to review congressional legislation, or that a more
deferential standard does not provide sufficient judicial review. This is so because the two cases
both passed the strict scrutiny analysis that the Court applied. Also, it would be inaccurate to use
those cases as evidence that Congress invidiously discriminates, because the classifications were
not formed in the course of deliberate decision making by the Congress, but rather were made
pursuant to a broad delegation of power to the military.
84. The congressional power to curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction, see U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, could be considered a powerful incentive for the Court to give its imprimatur to congressional
legislation.
85. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, provided in part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations. . . of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color,
regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
The Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the law was unconstitu-
tional because it was not supported by the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments.
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In sum, adoption of the McCulloch analysis for review of congressional
legislation would cure the inconsistencies that flow from an application of the
strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, in using such an analysis, the Supreme
Court would not "tread on legislative ground"8 6 in ensuring that Congress has
obeyed the Constitution.87
LISA MARIE NIEMAN
86. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
87. It is interesting to note that in an apparent abandonment of the strict scrutiny, interven-
tionist stance, the Court recently adopted in Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981), an analy-
sis similar to the MeCulloch analysis. In writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that a
congressional statute authorizing the President to require the registration of males and not females
did not violate the fifth amendment's equal protection component. This determination was based
largely on the ground that Congress was exercising its authority over national defense and mili-
tary affairs and that "in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference." Id. at
2651. Although it refused to advance "any further 'refinement' in the applicable [equal protec-
tion] tests," id. at 2654, the Court found the exemption of women from registration was "closely
related" to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration. Id. at 2658. However, the articulated
reasons for the exemption found in the congressional record were based primarily on administra-
tive convenience. The Court stated, "It is not for this Court to dismiss such [administrative]
problems as insignificant in the context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future
mobilization." Id. at 2660. Administrative convenience, however, has never been sufficient to
justify a gender classification. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Presumably
administrative convenience would not be sufficient to support a classification examined under the
rational basis standard because such a classification involves the "very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the [Constitution]. . . ." Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971)).
See also Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal-The Supreme Court and Gender Classification
Cases: 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 87 (1981).
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